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Recent Developments in English Law
Affecting International
Transactions-II
This article brings up to date the author's earlier article with the same
title, which was published in the 1981 Fall issue of The International Lawyer
(hereinafter the 1981 article). 1 The present article considers developments
on two of the topics covered in the 1981 article, namely the Mareva injunc-
tion, and international aspects of the Arbitration Act, 1979.
Instead of the topic, judgments in foreign currencies covered in the 1981
article, a new topic, aspects of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act
1982, is reviewed here.
I. The Mareva Injunction
The introduction into English law of this procedure in 1975 was described
and discussed in the 1981 article. 2 The Mareva injunction, as an interlocu-
tory remedy in commercial and shipping cases, to restrain a defendant from
removing or disposing of assets out of the jurisdiction until judgment is given
in an action on the merits, was already a general doctrine. Since then the
Mareva injunction has been expanded and its relationship with other reme-
dies and its effects generally more closely defined. These developments will
now be considered.
*Mr. Michael Brandon is a member of the English Bar who practices English law from
Commugny, Switzerland.
1. See Brandon, Recent Developments in English Law Affecting International Transactions,
15 INT'L LAW. 629 (1981), which covered developments to January 1981. This article reflects
developments through July 1984.
2. Id. at 629-633.
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A. STATUTORY FORCE AND ITS APPLICATION
The Mareva injunction was given statutory force by section 37(3) of the
Supreme Court Act, 1981, which states:
The power of the High Court ... to grant an interlocutory injunction restraining a
party to any proceedings from removing from the jurisdiction of the High Court,
or otherwise dealing with, assets located within the jurisdiction shall be exercis-
able in cases where that party is, as well as in cases where he is not, domiciled,
resident or present within that jurisdiction.
Thus, there is no distinction between a U.K. national or resident on the one
hand, and a foreign-based or foreign national, on the other. The position of
a plaintiff suing an English defendant is the same as that of a plaintiff suing a
foreign defendant.3
The House of Lords had held in The Siskina4 that a substantive cause of
action triable in England was essential to support a Mareva injunction unless
the injunction was part of the substantive relief sought. Thus, the plaintiff
must have a cause of action within the jurisdiction and a good arguable case.
A court considering an ex parte application for a Mareva injunction is
obliged to consider the likelihood of success of the plaintiff in the main
action. It is for the plaintiff to satisfy the court that his chances of success are
good and that there is a serious risk that unless the injunction is granted the
defendant will take steps to put his assets beyond the reach of the plaintiff
when judgment is given for the latter. This must be done by adequate
evidence and the mere fact that the defendant is a corporate body with a
registered office outside the jurisdiction will not be sufficient. As Lord
Justice Kerr said in Z Limited v. A5 :
It follows that in my view Mareva injunctions should be granted, but granted only,
when it appears to the court that there is a combination of two circumstances.
First, when it appears likely that the plaintiff will recover judgment against the
defendant for a certain or approximate sum. Second, when there are also reasons
to believe that the defendant has assets within the jurisdiction to meet the
judgment, in whole or in part, but may well take steps designed to ensure that
these are no longer available or traceable when judgment is given against him.
The Commercial Court has held in a recent case that the test to be applied
by the court when deciding whether to grant a Mareva injunction is whether,
after the plaintiff has shown that he has at least a good arguable case, and
after considering the whole of the evidence before the court, the refusal of
3. It has been held that where, on an exparte application leave has been granted to issue both
a writ against a defendant out of the jurisdiction, and a Mareva injunction to preserve assets
within the jurisdiction, the defendant is not to be taken as to have submitted to the jurigdiction
with regard to the substantive action by reason of a subsequent application to discharge the
Mareva injunction. See HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, ANNUAL ABRIDGMENT, para. 2624
(1983).
4. 3 All E.R. 803 (1977).
5. Z Limited v. A, I All E.R. 566 at 572 (1982).
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an injunction would involve a real risk that a judgment or award in the
plaintiff's favor would remain unsatisfied because of the defendant's re-
moval of assets from the jurisdiction or dissipation of assets within the
jurisdiction. A Mareva injunction would not be granted merely for the
purpose of providing a plaintiff with security for a claim, even where it
appeared likely to succeed and when the granting of the injunction would
not cause hardship to the defendant.6
As stated in the 1981 article, 7 the injunction will not merely prevent the
defendant from removing assets out of the jurisdiction but will also restrain
him from disposing of them within the jurisdiction. This point has been
confirmed by the holding of the Court of Appeal in Z Limited v. A that the
phrase in section 37(3) of the Supreme Court Act, 1981," . . . dealing with,
assets located within the jurisdiction," 8 means that the power of the court to
grant a Mareva injunction extends to cases in which there is a danger that the
assets will be dissipated within the jurisdiction as well as removed out of the
jurisdiction. 9 It should be especially noted that the courts have so far only
been prepared to grant a Mareva injunction with respect to "assets located
within the jurisdiction" in accordance with the terms of section 37(3) of the
Supreme Court Act, 1981.
The remedy is not only available to litigants but also to provide a claimant
in an arbitration with security for the enforcement of any award which he
may obtain. A Mareva injunction may be sought even before the arbitration
has commenced and the power of the court to grant an injunction is not
excluded by the fact that the claim arises under a nondomestic arbitration
agreement within the meaning of section 3 (7) of the Arbitration Act,
1979.10
B. NATURE OF ASSETS
In light of the Court of Appeal's decision in Z Limited v. A," it appears
that the mere nature of the assets covered by a Mareva injunction is no limit
6. Ninemia Maritime Corp. v. Trave Schiffahrtsgesellschaft m.b.H & Co. K.G., The Nie-
dersachsen, 1 All E.R. 398 (1984).
7. See supra note 2.
8. Thereisadictum by the Court of Appeal in CBS United Kingdom Limitedv. Lambert and
another, 3 All E.R. 237 at 241 (1982), to the effect that the words "dealing with" in section 37
(3) of the Supreme Court Act, 1981,
"are wide enough to include disposing of, selling, pledging or charging, and there are no
limitations put on the word 'assets' from which it follows that this word includes chattels such
as motor vessels, jewellery, objets d'art and other valuables as well as choses in action...
9. See supra note 5.
10. SIR MICHAEL MUSTILL & S. BOYD, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
IN ENGLAND, 301 (London, Butterworths, 1982).
11. See supra note 5.
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on its effectiveness. A Mareva injunction has immediate effect on every
asset12 of the defendant covered by the injunction because it operates in rem
in the same manner as the arrest of a ship. Any authority given to third
parties allowing them to deal with the assets in accordance with the instruc-
tions of the defendant is revoked once these third parties have notice of the
injunction.
The Commercial Court in Orwell Steel (Errection and Fabrication) Lim-
ited v. Asphalt & Tarmac Limited,13 in March 1984, extended the Mareva
injunction to post-judgment assets, holding that it could be said that there
was greater justification for restraining a defendant's use of his property
after judgment against him than before. In this case the plaintiff had entered
judgment in default of compliance by the defendant with the conditions of
its leave to defend, but was unable to levy execution of the judgment and
feared that the defendant would transfer its assets to another company
thereby avoiding the effect of the judgment completely. The plaintiff sought
a Mareva injunction to restrain any such transfer except insofar as the
defendant's assets exceeded the amount of the judgment and costs.
C. VARIATION OF INJUNCTION
After a plaintiff has obtained an injunction, he is obliged to give notice
thereof to the defendant and to any third parties concerned. Both the
defendant and any third parties are entitled to apply to have the injunction
varied or discharged. Thus in PCW (Underwriting Agencies) Limited v.
Dixon, 14 the Commercial Court held that given the purpose of a Mareva
injunction (to prevent a plaintiff from being deprived of the proceeds of an
action should he be successful by a defendant transferring his assets outside
the jurisdiction or dissipating his assets within the jurisdiction), the remedy
was, however, not intended to give the plaintiff priority over such assets, to
prevent a defendant from paying his debts as they fell due, to "punish him
for his alleged misdeeds" or to enable a plaintiff to exert pressure on him to
settle an action. Applying these principles to the facts in that case, the Court
allowed the injunction to be varied to permit the defendant sufficient funds
12. It was held in Searose Limited v. Seatrain (UK) Limited, 1 All E.R. 806 (1981), that
where a Mareva injunction is sought in respect of an asset which is not identified with precision
(e.g., money held in an unidentified bank account), the court may require the plaintiff to give an
undertaking to pay the reasonable costs incurred by any person, other than the defendant, to
whom notice of the terms of the injunction is given, in ascertaining whether any asset to which
the order applies is within his possession or control. Although primarily directed to protecting
banks from expenses in tracing unidentified accounts, such an undertaking may be required to
protect other third parties similarly affected.
13. FINANCIAL TIMES COMMERCIAL LAW REPORT, 26 March 1984; see also I.F.L. REV. 40 (May
1984).
14. 2 All E.R. 158 (1983).
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to meet his reasonable living expenses, pay his outstanding debts and defend
himself in the proceedings brought by the plaintiff. However, the Commer-
cial Court also held in A and another v. C and others (no.2)15 that although
the court had jurisdiction to qualify a Mareva injunction where the defend-
ant satisfied the court that assets subject to the injunction were required for
a purpose which did not conflict with the policy underlying the Mareva
injunction, in order to satisfy that burden, the defendant had to go further
than merely stating that he owed money to a third party and had to show that
he had no other assets available out of which the debt could be paid.
It is worth noting that where an innocent third party, who is affected by a
Mareva injunction, successfully applies to the court for a variation of the
order, he will be entitled to have all the costs which he has incurred in
respect of the application paid by the plaintiff who has obtained the injunc-
tion. This is provided that they are not unreasonable in amount or unreason-
ably incurred.
D. PROPRIETARY INTEREST
A Mareva injunction does not confer upon the plaintiff any proprietary
rights; nothing in the nature of a lien over the assets is acquired. As held in
Iraqi Ministry of Defence v. Arcepey Shipping Company S.A., The Angel
Bell,16 in the event of the defendant's insolvency, a plaintiff does not acquire
a priority by virtue of a Mareva injunction to which he would not otherwise
be entitled. As further held by the Court of Appeal in Campbell Mussels and
others v. Thompson and others,17 the Mareva injunction was never intended
to allow a plaintiff to put himself in the position of a secured creditor. Again,
the Court of Appeal in Sanders Lead Co. Inc. v. Entores Metal Brokers
Limited18 held that only in the most exceptional circumstances should a
Mareva creditor be permitted to intervene in an action where his interest in
the outcome related solely to the fate of his injunction. In that case, a party
obtaining a Mareva injunction was not enabled to be joined in an action
between the debtor and another alleged creditor.
E. ABUSE
An application for a Mareva injunction is frequently made ex parte where
there are grounds for believing that were the defendant given advance
notice or warning, the latter's assets would be removed from the jurisdic-
15. 2 All E.R. 126 (1981).
16. 1 All E.R. 480 (1980).
17. THE LAW SOCIETY'S GAZETrE, 25 July 1984, at 2140.
18. 1 All E.R. 857 (1984).
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tion. Thus, the court in Iraqi Ministry of Defence v. Arcepey held that "The
whole point of the Mareva jurisdiction was to enable the plaintiff to proceed
by stealth so as to preempt any action by the defendant to remove his assets
from the jurisdiction whether by his own act or by a transfer to a collaborator
within the jurisdiction. ... 19 At the same time, the courts have become
increasingly aware of the importance of preventing any abuse of the Mareva
procedure and the protection of third parties. Lord Justice Kerr said in Z
Limited v. A:
However, the jurisdiction must not be abused. In particular, I would regard two
types of situations as an abuse of it. First, the increasingly common one, as I
believe, of a Mareva injunction being applied for and granted in circumstances in
which there may be no real danger of the defendant dissipating his assets to make
himself judgment-proof; where it may be invoked, almost as a matter of course, by
a plaintiff in order to obtain security in advance for any judgment which he may
obtain; and where its real effect is to exert pressure on the defendant to settle the
action. The second, and fortunately much rarer, illustration of what I would
regard as an abuse of this procedure, is where it is used as a means of enabling a
person to make a payment under a contract or intended contract to someone in
circumstances where he regards the demand for the payment as unjustifiable; or
where he actually believes, or even knows, that the demand is unlawful; and where
he obtains a Mareva injunction ex parte in advance of the payment, which is then
immediately served and has the effect of "freezing" the sum paid over.
20
The Court of Appeal also dealt with the matter of abuse in Galaxia
Maritime S.A. v. Mineralimportexport, The Eleftherios.21 In that case it was
held that where the effect of granting a Mareva injunction would be to
interfere substantially with an innocent third party's freedom of action
generally or freedom to trade (for example, by interfering with his perform-
ance of a contract made between him and the defendant relating to the assets
in question), the third party's right to freedom of action and freedom of
trade should prevail over the plaintiff's wish to secure the defendant's assets
for himself. Accordingly, it was an abuse of the Mareva jurisdiction to allow
a plaintiff to serve a shipowner with a Mareva injunction relating to a cargo
owned or alleged to be owned by the defendant which was on board the
shipowner's vessel in order to prevent the vessel sailing out of the jurisdic-
tion with the cargo. The fact that the plaintiff had undertaken to indemnify
the shipowner against loss or damage suffered in consequence of the grant of
the injunction was not a sufficient reason to allow the injunction to be served
19. See supra note 16, at 481.
20. See supra note 5 at 571. Also in order to ensure the Mareva injunction is properly
exercised and its purpose secured (i.e., to prevent abuse), the court will, where necessary,
exercise its power to order discovery or interrogatories. See A.J. Bakhor & Co. Ltd. v. Bilton, 2
All E.R. 565 (1981).
21. 1 All E.R. 796 (1982). In this case the ship was on a voyage charter and the facts were
therefore distinguished from those in Clipper Martime Co. v. Mineralimportexport, 3 All E.R.
664 (1981), where the ship was on time charter.
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on the shipowner if he objected to the injunction, since the mere proffering
of an indemnity did not entitle the plaintiff to interfere with the shipowner's
business activities and to obtain the advantage of a Mareva injunction at the
shipowner's expense. Since the effect of granting the injunction would be to
prevent the shipowner sending his ship on a voyage out of the jurisdiction
under a previously concluded contract with the defendant, it would be an
abuse of the Mareva jurisdiction to allow the injunction to continue. The
Court of Appeal therefore granted the application of the shipowner to
discharge the Mareva injunction.
F. EFFECT ON THIRD PARTIES
There are new developments concerning the effect of the injunction on
third parties generally and on banks in particular, upon which the burden of
policing Mareva injunctions often falls. The Commercial Court in Oceanica
Castelana Armadora SA v. Mineralimportexport (Barclays Bank Interna-
tional Limited intervening), The Theotokos22 held that although a bank
holding funds subject to a Mareva injunction (having regard to the current
wording of such injunctions in January 1983) could not exercise a banker's
usual rights of set-off against the funds without first applying to the court to
vary the injunction, it was entitled to a variation of the injunction once it had
applied. This would enable it to exercise rights of set-off over the funds
subject to the injunction, in connection with any facilities it had granted to
the defendant before it received notification of the injunction. The court
indicated that the Mareva injunction was not intended to interfere with
contractual rights between a third party and the defendant, and a bank
which held funds subject to such an injunction ought not to be, merely
because it held the funds, in a worse position than the defendant's other
creditors in respect of whom the defendant could apply for a variation of the
injunction to enable him to draw on his bank account to pay them. It was
further held that the bank was entitled to a variation of the injunction
without having to disclose information about the state of the defendant's
accounts with the bank or the existence within the jurisdiction of other free
assets of the defendant. The Court acknowledged that to require such
disclosures would be to interfere with contractual rights between the bank
and the defendant. It followed therefore that a bank holding funds subject to
a Mareva injunction was not required to accept, in lieu of the bank's usual
rights of set-off, an indemnity from the plaintiff with respect to the sums
owing or likely to be owed in the future to the bank from the defendant. It
further followed that the bank was entitled to a variation of the injunction
issued against the defendant to enable the bank to exercise a right of set-off
22. 2 All E.R. 65 (1983).
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in connection with loans made to the defendant, the right of set-off being
exercisable in respect of both the interest on loans already accrued due at the
date of notification of the injunction and interest accruing due in the future.
In this case, the Court applied the abovementioned decision in Galaxia
Maritime SA.
The position of third parties and of banks in particular was considered in
depth by the Court of Appeal inZ Limited v. A. 23 In that case, the plaintiff,
a foreign company, had been defrauded of some £2 million by persons in
England. Some of this amount was paid into the five major clearing banks
and some was used to purchase goods and real property. The plaintiff
company obtained a Mareva injunction against both the fraudulent persons
and various innocent third parties, including the five clearing banks, re-
straining them from dealing with the assets. The plaintiff recovered much of
its losses and the action itself was settled but the five clearing banks applied
for leave to appeal against the Mareva injunction with a view to obtaining
clarification of the law as to the obligations of third parties on whom such
injunctions were served. Following are the main points on which the Court
of Appeal was unanimous; on other points opinions differed.
If a bank or other third party has notice of a Mareva injunction which
affects money or other assets in its hands, it is contempt of court knowingly
to assist in the disposal of the assets, whether or not the defendant has
knowledge of the injunction. Accordingly, as soon as a bank or third party
concerned has notice of the injunction it must-pending further order-
freeze the defendant's bank account or other assets held by it, e.g., valu-
ables in a safe deposit box, according to the terms of the injunction. The
Court of Appeal followed with practical guidelines for applicants seeking
Mareva injunctions and to judges considering applications for such injunc-
tions. Where an application is made for a Mareva injunction which may
affect assets held by a bank or other innocent third party, the court should
have regard to the following principles:
(a) The plaintiff should normally be required when the injunction is
granted to give an undertaking to indemnify against any liability and to
pay any expenses reasonably incurred by a bank, or other innocent third
party, in complying with the injunction.
(b) The plaintiff should inform the court of the names of banks or other
third parties to whom it is proposed to give notice of the injunction.
(c) The plaintiff should, if possible, identify the assets in respect of which
the injunction is sought and support his application by a draft order for
consideration by the court which embodies, for example, particulars of
the banks and branches at which the defendant has accounts and the
numbers of the accounts, together with the undertakings to be given by
23. See supra note 5.
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the plaintiff as to service and indemnification of a bank or third party.
(d) Although it may be necessary to seek a comprehensive order which
freezes all the defendant's assets within the jurisdiction, the injunction
may where practicable be restricted to freezing the defendant's assets up
to a maximum sum, namely, the amount of the plaintiff's prima facie
justifiable claim, leaving the defendant free to deal with the balance.
However, because a bank or third party may not know what assets the
defendant has elsewhere and therefore may not know the extent to which
the assets it holds should be frozen, a maximum sum order may make
different provisions in relation to the defendant's assets generally and
those assets which are known or believed to be in the hands of a bank or
third party and that part of the order directed to a bank or other third
party should only require it to freeze the defendant's assets held by it up to
a specified maximum sum.
(e) Notice of the injunction must be served by the plaintiff as expedi-
tiously as possible on the defendant as well as on third parties and where
such notice is served by telephone or telex, it must be followed as soon as
is reasonably practicable, by a written copy of the order.
(f) Where a bank has notice of the granting of a Mareva injunction, it
may not honor checks drawn by the defendant but checks supported by
credit cards or check cards should be honored. The injunction does not
prevent the bank from making payments out of the defendant's bank
account which the bank is obliged to honor because they involve obliga-
tions to other parties, e.g., payments under a letter of credit or under a
bank guarantee or under a bill of exchange of which the defendant is the
payee, but the injunction does apply to the proceeds of such commercial
obligations if they are paid into an account of the defendant to which the
injunction applies.
G. CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Finally, with regard to the Mareva injunction, the following considera-
tions will be important in the future.
The rules that a Mareva injunction can only be granted when it is ancillary
to a substantive matter over which the English courts have jurisdiction, will
be modified when the provisions of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments
Act, 1982 (hereinafter called the 1982 Act), which relate to the Brussels
Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters of 1968 (hereinafter called the Brussels Convention),
as amended by the Accession Convention of 1978, and the Interpretation
Protocol of 1971, enter into effect. This will be timed to coincide with the
date on which the Accession Convention comes into force for the United
Kingdom. The Brussels Convention and the 1971 Protocol have been
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ratified by the six original EEC member states, all of which have, except for
Belgium, ratified the Accession Convention. The latter will enter into force
for the United Kingdom three months after Belgium and the United King-
dom, as a new EEC member state, will have ratified it. Belgium is now
expected to be in a position to ratify in the first half of 1985. The United
Kingdom is already in such position having passed the 1982 Act and adopted
and published The Rules of the Supreme Court (Amendment No. 2) 1983.
The 1982 Act has been called "perhaps the most important piece of
legislation relating to civil procedure enacted in this country this century."
24
For the United Kingdom, the Act brings into effect the rules of jurisdiction25
set out in the Brussels Convention as amended by the Accession Conven-
tion, and applies similar, but not identical, rules for allocating jurisdiction
between the constituent parts of the United Kingdom. Under section 25 of
the 1982 Act, the English High Court will have power to grant a Mareva
injunction where proceedings have been or are to be commenced in another
EEC member state, or in another part of the United Kingdom, and the
proceedings fall within the scope of the Brussels Convention.26 This means
that a Mareva injunction will be available in the English courts, even where
the courts of another EEC member state have jurisdiction over the sub-
stance, although the absence of jurisdiction over the merits will continue to
be a factor considered by the English courts in determining whether to grant
27
an injunction.
II. International Aspects of the Arbitration Act, 1979
A. STATUTE
The two main reforms of the Arbitration Act, 1979 (hereinafter called the
Act), noted in the 1981 article,28 were; (1) the substitution of a new judicial
review procedure for the case stated system; and (2) the establishment of
means for contracting out of the new review procedure by exclusion agree-
24. See L. COLLINS, THE CIVIL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS ACT 1982, preface (London,
Butterworths, 1983).
25. See post.
26. The scope of the 1968 Convention is defined by Article 1, Title I (as amended by the
Accession Convention) which reads:
"This Convention shall apply in civil and commercial matters whatever the nature of the
court or tribunal. It shall not extend, in particular, to revenue, customs or administrative
matters. The Convention shall not apply to: (1) The status or legal capacity of natural
persons, rights in property arising out of a matrimonial relationship, wills and succession;
(2) Bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the winding up of insolvent companies or other legal
persons, judicial arrangements, compositions and analogous proceedings; (3) Social secur-
ity; (4) Arbitration."
27. Section 25 (2) of the 1982 Act.
28. See supra note 1, at 636.
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ments particularly for international arbitrations. With regard to the first
reform, section 1 of the Act abolished both types of case stated, namely, that
of stating an award and that of stating a question of law arising in the course
of a reference. This section also abolished the jurisdiction of the High Court
to set aside or remit an arbitrator's award on the ground of error of fact or
law on the face of the award. Section 1(3) of the Act states that an appeal
may be brought by any of the parties to the reference: "(a) with the consent
of all the other parties to the reference; or (b) subject to section 3 below, 9
with the leave of the court." Section 1(4) provides that:
The High Court shall not grant leave under sub-section 3b above unless it consid-
ers that, having regard to all the circumstances, the determination of the question
of law concerned could substantially affect the rights of one or more of the parties
to the arbitration agreement; and the court may make any leave which it gives
conditional upon the applicant complying with such conditions as it considers
appropriate.
B. "LEAVE TO APPEAL": JUDICIAL GUIDANCE ON SECTION 1(3) (b)
It was not clear for some time after the passing of the Act as to the basis on
which the general discretion of the Court should be exercised under Section
1(3)(b) of the Act. Then came the decision by the House of Lords in Pioneer
Shipping Limited and others v. B TP Tioxide Limited, The Nema30 in which a
series of propositions, described as "guidelines" were laid down, which
although technically obiter dicta were immediately accepted as authoritative
statements. In the leading work on commercial arbitration in England,31
Mr. Justice Mustill and Stewart Boyd suggest that the judgments delivered
in The Nema "disclose a new philosophy of arbitration." They summarize it
as follows:
First, even in those cases where Parliament has preserved the jurisdiction to
entertain appeals, it is no longer axiomatic that the courts should be alert to
protect parties against decisions made contrary to that system of law which they
have expressly or impliedly selected as applicable to their disputes. Nor is there
any longer a paramount public interest in protecting the community from the
growth in particular trades of practices whereby the rights of the parties are
determined according to rules peculiar to those trades, and differing from the
general law of the land. Instead, the Court will proceed on the assumption that the
parties to an arbitration agreement are content to take the risk that the arbitrator
will make mistakes of law, just as they have always been understood as willing to
take the risk that he will make mistakes of fact. There is now a presumption in
favour of the chosen tribunal, not the chosen law.
Second, there are limits to this presumption. The parties are not assumed, in
general, to have submitted themselves unequivocally to honour an award which
can be shown to be founded upon a manifest error of law.
29. Section 3 deals with exclusion agreements.
30. 2 All E.R. 1030 (1981).
31. See supra note 10.
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Third, the strength of the presumption will vary from case to case.
Fourth, there is one consideration of public policy which on occasion will take
priority over the wishes of the parties: namely, the need to retain arbitration
appeals as a means of providing the raw material for decisions by the Court on
matters of general legal import. Arbitration appeals help to ensure that - (a)
English law will maintain an up to date repertory of rules, sufficient to deal with
the complexities of modern commerce, and (b) the courts can furnish authorita-
tive guidance to arbitrators on the principles by which they should apply their own
practical knowledge to individual commercial disputes, enabling them to decide
these disputes in a consistent and orderly fashion.
Fifth, the Court regards delay as a prime source of prejudice, both to the
efficacy of the arbitration system as a whole, and to the rights of the successful
claimant in particular. In the interests of eliminating the delay resulting from an
unmeritorious appeal the Court will very often regard it as acceptable to run some
risk of lending its own powers of enforcement to an award vhich the individual
judge may consider to be wrong. 32
Subsequent to The Nema, the Court of Appeal, in The Antaios,.33 a case
involving an appeal from an award arising out of a dispute relating to a
charterparty, held that on the issue of leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal
against a decision granting or refusing leave to appeal to the High Court, the
purpose of the 1979 Act was to encourage finality in arbitration and discour-
age appeals. Therefore a judge ought not to grant leave where the arbitra-
tor's decision although it raised a substantial and arguable point of law, was
probably right. The Court of Appeal further held that on the issue of leave to
appeal to the High Court under section 1(3)(b) of the Act, a judge ought to
refuse leave if he decides that the arbitrator's decision was probably right,
regardless of the basis on which the arbitrator reached his decision or
whether the Court of Appeal might, simply because it was an appellate
court, take a different view. Leave ought to be given if the resolution of this
issue would substantially affect the parties' rights and there was a conflict of
judicial opinion on the issue.
After The Antaios case, in Finelvet A.G. v. Vinava Shipping Company
Limited, The Crystalis,34 Mr. Justice Mustill made "certain comments"
concerning the Court's approach to an appeal under the 1979 Act, in light of
the guidance given by the House of Lords in The Nema:
In the first place, it must be kept in mind that quite different considerations
apply to the question whether, in the exercise of its discretion, the court should
grant leave to appeal under § 3 of the 1979 Act from those which are material when
the court comes to hear the appeal itself. The first stage is a filtering process, at
which the court gives effect to the policy embodied in the 1979 Act and enunciated
in The Nema, whereby the interests of finality are placed ahead of the desire to
ensure that the arbitrator's decision is strictly in accordance with the law. Some
examination of the merits takes place at this stage, because the stronger the
32. Id. at 558-9.
33. 3 All E.R. 777 (1983).
34. 2 All E.R. 658 (1983).
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applicant's case for saying that the arbitrator was wrong, the better his prospect of
obtaining leave to appeal. But the examination of the law is summary in nature,
and does not lead to any definite conclusion.
The exercise is discretionary throughout, the mesh of the filter is fine and it
must, I think, be recognised that some cases will be caught in the filter which
would, if the appeal had been allowed to go forward, result in a decision that the
award could not stand.
The position when the appeal itself is heard is quite different. Here there is no
discretion. The only issue is whether it can be shown that the decision of the
arbitrator was wrong in law. The court must answer this question yes or no and, if
the answer is yes, the appeal must be allowed however finely balanced the issue
may be. It is not only unhelpful but positively misleading to introduce at this stage
the questions of degree raised by The Nema guidelines, such as whether the award
is clearly or obviously wrong, for these are material only to the discretionary
process of finding out whether the award should be allowed to come before the
court for challenge.
Starting therefore with the proposition that the court is concerned to decide, on
the hearing of the appeal, whether the award can be shown to be wrong in law,
how is this question to be tackled? In a case such as the present, the answer is to be
found by dividing the arbitrator's process of reasoning into three stages.
(1) The arbitrator ascertains the facts. This process includes the makings of
findings on any facts which are in dispute.
(2) The arbitrator ascertains the law. This process comprises not only the
identification of all material rules of statute and common law, but also the
identification and interpretation of the relevant parts of the contract, and the
identification of those facts which must be taken into account when the decision is
reached.
(3) In the light of the facts and the law so ascertained, the arbitrator reaches his
decision.
In some cases, the third stage will be purely mechanical. Once the law is
correctly ascertained, the decision follows inevitably from the application of it to
the facts found. In other instances, however, the third stage involves an element of
judgment on the part of the arbitrator. There is no uniquely "right" answer to be
derived from marrying the facts and the law, merely a choice of answers, none of
which can be described as wrong.
The second stage of the process is the proper subject matter of an appeal under
the 1979 Act. In some cases an error of law can be demonstrated by studying the
way in which the arbitrator has stated the law in his reasons. It is, however, also
possible to infer an error of law in those cases where a correct application of the
law to the facts found would lead inevitably to one answer, whereas the arbitrator
has arrived at another, and this can be so even if the arbitrator has stated the law in
his reasons in a manner which appears to be correct: for the court is then driven to
assume that he did not properly understand the principles which he had stated.
Whether the third stage can ever be the proper subject of an appeal, in those
cases where the making of the decision does not follow automatically from the
ascertainment of the facts and the law, is not a matter on which it is necessary to
express a view in the present case. The Nema and The Evia show that, wherethe
issue is one of commercial frustation, the court will not intervene, save only to the
extent that it will have to form its own view, in order to see whether the arbitrator's
decision is out of conformity with the only correct answer or (as the case may be)
lies outside the range of correct answers. This is part of the process of investigating
whether the arbitrator has gone wrong at the second stage. But once the court has
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concluded that a tribunal which correctly understood the law could have arrived at
the same answer as the one reached by the arbitrator, the fact that the individual
judge himself would have come to a different conclusion is no ground for disturb-
ing the award."
35
C. CONTRACTING OUT BY EXCLUSION AGREEMENTS:
SECTIONS 3 AND 4
An exclusion agreement excludes the right of appeal with respect to a
question of law arising out of an award and the making of an application
with respect to an award under section 1 of the Act; and excludes an
application to the High Court for the determination of a point of law under
section 2. The effect of an exclusion agreement depends upon the type of
arbitration agreement involved. Thus, section 3(7) of the Act defines a
"domestic arbitration agreement" as follows:
An arbitration agreement which does not provide expressly or by implication, for
arbitration in a State other than the United Kingdom and to which neither -
(a) an individual who is a national of, or habitually resident in, any State other
than the United Kingdom, nor
(b) a body corporate which is incorporated in, or whose central management
and control is exercised in, any State other than the United Kingdom
is a party at the time the arbitration agreement is entered into.
In a "domestic arbitration agreement" an exclusion agreement is only
effective if entered into after the arbitration has begun. There are, however,
certain "excepted categories". Section 4(1) provides that where the award
or the question of law arising in the course of the reference relates in whole
or in part to: "a question or claim falling within the Admiralty jurisdiction of
the High Court or a dispute arising out of a contract of insurance or a dispute
arising out of a commodity contract", an exclusion agreement will be
effective only provided it was entered into after the arbitration had com-
menced or the contract is expressed to be governed by a foreign law, that is,
one other than the law of England and Wales. 3 6
With regard to all other nondomestic arbitration agreements, a valid
exclusion agreement may have been entered into either before or after the
Act entered into force on 1 August 1979 and may or may not form part of-an
arbitration agreement. An exclusion agreement may be expressed to relate
to a particular award, awards under a particular reference or to any other
description of awards.
The question of whether the incorporation of an exclusion agreement by
reference is valid under section 3(1) of the Act arose and was decided in a
1983 case. A claim in a contract for the sale and purchase of gas oil provided:
35. Id. at 662-3.
36. Section 4 (3) of the Act allows for. the future abolition of these special categories of
arbitration.
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"inco terms 1980 English law arbitration, if any, London, according to ICC
Rules.",37 Disputes arose which were referred to arbitration and an award
was made in favor of the buyers. The agreement being a non-domestic one,
the sellers applied to the English High Court to appeal against the award on
the ground that the exclusion agreement constituted by Article 24 of the ICC
Rules had not been expressly incorporated into the contract and that there-
fore section 3(1) of the Act had not been complied with. The court dismissed
this application holding that the incorporation of an exclusion agreement by
reference did not offend and was not prevented by section 3(1) of the Act.38
This ruling has since been upheld by the Court of Appeal in Marine
Contractors Inc. v. Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Lim-
ited which decided that the adoption of the ICC Rules operates as an
exclusion agreement for the purposes of the Act in view of the terms of
Article 24 of the Rules. 39 It follows that incorporation by reference does
constitute a valid form of an exclusion agreement and that the terms of
Article 24 of the ICC Rules are sufficient to exclude an appeal to the English
Courts. These decisions accord with the policy of the Act to produce finality
in arbitration proceedings.40
D. PURPOSE OF Acr SUCCESSFUL
The intent of the Act was to promote the conducting of major interna-
tional arbitrations in England. 41 The evidence suggests that this purpose has
37. Article 24 of the Rules of the ICC Court of Arbitration provides as follows regarding
finality and enforceability of an award:
1. The arbitral award shall be final.
2. By submitting the dispute to arbitration by the International Chamber of Commerce, the
parties shall be deemed to have undertaken to carry out the resulting award without delay
and to have waived their right to any form of appeal insofar as such waiver can validly be
made.
38. Arab Energy Corporation Limited v. Olieprodukten Nederland BV, IFL REV. 39
(September 1983).
39. See IFL REV. 42 (August 1984).
40. Some additional points are worthy of mention: (1) Section 3(2) of the Act provides that
with regard to all types of nondomestic arbitration agreements, the jurisdiction of the High
Court under section 24 (2) of the Arbitration Act, 1950, to decide questions of fraud has been
removed, except insofar as an exclusion agreement otherwise provides.
(2) Overall, it should be stressed that even in cases where the right of appeal exists, it only
relates to questions of law and not to questions of fact, and that in the English courts foreign law
is a matter of fact.
(3) International arbitrations arising under nonstandard contracts involving large sums of
money and to which state-owned agencies may be one of the parties, will normally be subject to
an exclusion agreement which will be effective to exclude both appeals against an award and
applications to the High Court to determine questions of law. See Brandon, supra note 1, at 638.
41. See generally "Situs London," a paper by William D. Park delivered at the International
Law Association's Conference on Arbitration under International Commercial Contracts-
Current Issues and Practical Problems, in London, May 1981, and the proceedings of "Forum
London," a study conference to examine London as a forum for the resolution of international
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been essentially achieved. Thus, to quote D.W. Shenton, London solicitor
and Chairman of the Committee on Procedures for Settling Disputes of the
International Bar Association's Section on Business Law: "It is submitted
that the English Commercial Court has given ample evidence of a change of
heart and a desire to meet international objections and discourage
appeals." 42 Professor J.E. Adams of the University of London is somewhat
more cautious:
Arbitration flourishes. The oft-lauded expertise of English arbitrators, counsel,
solicitors and commercial judges enables London to continue to compete with
rival arbitration centres abroad. The protagonists of the 1979 reforms continue to
assert that it has reversed any feared decline and has ended the abuse of appeal
merely to delay payment .... The process of elucidating the Act continues. There
is no method of determining how freely the power to contract out of the new rights
of appeal in most non-domestic contracts has been exercised, first because it is too
early for the pattern to have emerged and secondly, because collecting negative
statistics is always a matter of uncertainty.,
43
On the other hand, Sir John Donaldson, P.C., Master of the Rolls, said in
February 1983:
When the Act was passed one or two American lawyers expressed doubts as to
whether English judges would not seek to avoid the effect of the reforms. Section
23 of the Arbitration Act, 1950, contains wide and necessary powers enabling the
court to set an award aside where an arbitrator has misconducted himself or the
proceedings, and section 22 contains an almost unfettered discretion to remit an
award to the arbitrator for further consideration. The Americans' suggestion was
that the judges would seek to hold that for an arbitrator to make an error of law,
even if it did not emerge on the face of the award but was only proved by extrinsic
evidence, constituted misconduct and so entitled the court to set the award aside.
Alternatively, they would remit the award with a direction on the law.
A variant of this suggestion was that the judges would use what has been
referred to as the Anisminic doctrine and hold that since the parties in agreeing to
arbitration conferred authority on the arbitrator to decide the dispute in accord-
ance with the law and not otherwise, any error of law constituted an excess of
jurisdiction. The judges would then restrain enforcement of the award, thus
producing the same result as if the award had been set aside, save that the parties
would be unable to begin again. I am happy, but not in the least surprised, to be
able to report that no such thing has happened. 4
A good decision for London as a main centre for international commercial
arbitration was reached by the Court of Appeal in Bank Mellat v. Helliniki
Techniki S.A. 45 In that case the claimant was a Greek company and the
commercial disputes in the 1980s held under the auspices of the International Bar Association
in London in September 1982. Note also that the London Court of Arbitration has changed its
name to the London Court of International Arbitration.
42. Shenton, Attachments and Other Interim Court Remedies in Support ofArbitration-The
English Courts, in INT'L Bus. LAW. 101-106, 2(1984).
43. All E.R. Rev. 18, 26-27 (1983).
44. INT'L Bus. LAW. 189, 190 (1983).
45. 3 All E.R. 428 (1983). See also comments by Sigvard Jarvin, General Counsel for the
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respondent an Iranian bank, and they had entered into a contract concern-
ing the development of land in Iran which contract was governed by Iranian
law. Although neither party carried on business or had any connection with
England, the contract contained an arbitration clause providing for arbitra-
tion in London in accordance with the ICC Rules. A dispute in connection
with the contract arose and the claimant commenced arbitration proceed-
ings in London against the respondent. The latter then applied to the High
Court for an order for security for costs under section 12(6)(a) of the
Arbitration Act, 1950, on the grounds that claimant was a resident out of the
jurisdiction and that there was reason to believe that the claimant would be
unable to pay the respondent's costs if the latter received an arbitral award.
The claimant argued that such an order would be inconsistent with the terms
of the ICC Rules and inappropriate in an international arbitration which
took place in London between parties neither of whom had any other
connection with England.
The Court of Appeal, the High Court judge having refused to make the
order, confirmed that decision holding that as a general rule in international
arbitrations, the English courts would decline to exercise their jurisdiction
under section 12(6)(a) of the 1950 Act to order security for costs, unless
there were a more specific connection with England than the mere fact that
the parties had agreed that an arbitration was to take place there. The fact
that the claimant was ordinarily resident outside the jurisdiction was in
principle not a special circumstance which would justify the court ordering
security for costs. 46
Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce in Jarvin, London as a Place
for International Arbitration-some observations in light of the Arbitration Act 1979 and the
Bank Mellat v. Helliniki Techniki case, 1 J. INT'L ARB. 59, 67-71 (1984).
46. Mention should be made of the formation in 1981 of The London International Arbitra-
tion Trust Limited, located at Stone House, 128 Bishopsgate, London EC2M 4JP. As stated in a
brochure issued by the Trust:
The Arbitration Act 1979 was the first step towards removing the anomalies and difficulties
arising from the old special case procedure and at the same time strengthening the control
exercisable by arbitrators over cases referred to them for determination.
It is appreciated that there remains room for improvement and one purpose for the formation
in 1981 of The London International Arbitration Trust Limited was to seek to secure any
required further changes. The membership of the Trust currently consists of English and
overseas lawyers and arbitrators. Another purpose is to encourage and promote the use of
facilities in London for arbitration proceedings in commercial disputes of all kinds, especially
those of international character. (London International Arbitration Trust Ltd., "Arbitration
in London," Preface (July 1983)).
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III. Aspects of The Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act, 1982
A. DESCRIPrION
The provisions of the 1982 Act which relate to the Brussels Convention of
1968, as amended by the Accession Convention of 1978 (hereinafter called
the Convention), will enter into effect, probably on a date near mid-1985,
when the Accession Convention comes into force for the United Kingdom.
Pertinent to this description of developments are the jurisdiction and en-
forcement of judgments issues which will arise in practice when these
provisions of the 1982 Act enter into force. Under section 2(1) of the 1982
Act, the Convention and the Protocol of 1971 shall have the force of law in
the United Kingdom.
Section 1 of Title 11 of the Convention establishes the domicile of the
defendant as the primary basis of jurisdiction 47 and bars certain long arm
bases of jurisdiction against defendants domiciled in EEC member states.
Thus, persons domiciled in a member state must, whatever their nationality,
be sued in the courts of that state. Persons domiciled in, but not nationals of
a member state, will have the benefit and burden of the rules of jurisdiction
in that state applying to nationals. This means that by reason of the Conven-
tion any individual or corporation-irrespective of nationality, and wher-
ever resident, domiciled or registered-may commence legal proceedings in
any member state provided the jurisdictional grounds set out in the Conven-
tion are satisfied.
B. INDIVIDUALS' DOMICILE
With regard to the domicile of individuals, Article 52 of the Convention
provides:
In order to determine whether a party is domiciled in the Contracting State
whose courts are seised of the matter the court shall apply its internal law. If a
party is not domiciled in the State whose courts are seised of the matter, then in
order to determine whether the party is domiciled in another Contracting State,
the court shall apply the law of that State. The domicile of a party shall, however,
be determined in accordance with his national law if, by that law, his domicile
depends on that of another person or on the seat of an authority.
Where a United Kingdom court is seised, the relevant internal law will be
found in section 41 of the 1982 Act. This provides that an individual is
domiciled in the United Kingdom if and only if he is resident in the United
Kingdom and the nature and circumstances of his residence indicate that he
has a substantial connection with the United Kingdom. If an individual is
resident in the United Kingdom for the last three months or more, the
47. However, the Convention contains no definition of domicile.
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requirement of substantial connection is presumed to be fulfilled unless the
contrary is proved. Moreover, an individual is domiciled in a particular
place in the United Kingdom if and only if he is domiciled in the part of the
United Kingdom in which that place is situated and he is resident in that
place. He is domiciled in a particular part of the United Kingdom if and only
if he is resident in that part and the nature and circumstances of his residence
indicate that he has a substantial connection with that part. It should be
noted that the provisions of section 41 of the 1982 Act differ substantially
from the ordinary English law rules relating to domicile, whereunder there
are the concepts of domicile of origin and domicile of dependancy, of only
one domicile and the requirement of a "permanent home."
48
Section 1, Article 3 of Title II of the Convention bars long-arm rules of
jurisdiction with respect to persons domiciled in a member state since the
jurisdictional rules in the Convention are all embracing from the standpoint
of suits against such persons. This means, insofar as the United Kingdom is
concerned that the following rules inter alia which otherwise would enable
the courts to take jurisdiction will be inapplicable against persons domiciled
in a Member State, namely, the fact that the document instituting the
proceedings was served on the defendant during his temporary presence in
the United Kingdom; the fact of the presence within the United Kingdom
of property belonging to the defendant or the seizure by the plaintiff of
property situated in the United Kingdom. However, section 1, Article 4 of
Title II, which deals with suits against persons who are not domiciled in a
member state, provides that the jurisdiction of the courts of each member
state shall be determined by its domestic law, 49 including the long-arm rules,
the benefit of which is given to a plaintiff, who is domiciled in a member
state, irrespective of nationality.
Following from the above rules, the liability to suit in the United Kingdom
of a U.S. citizen from California who resides in London may be considered.
If he has resided in London for three months, he will be deemed to have a
substantial connection with the United Kingdom, and therefore considered
as domiciled in the United Kingdom and subject to the jurisdiction of the
English courts. If he has not been resident in London for three months, and
also resides in Paris, it will be for the English courts to apply French law to
determine whether he is domiciled in France. If the court found that he was
not domiciled in the United Kingdom or in France, it would still be able to
apply its long arm jurisdiction rules. Moreover, because of Article 4 of the
Convention any plaintiff of any nationality domiciled in France would gain
48. See DICEY & MORRIS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, 100-148 (10th ed. 1980).
49. Subject only to Article 16 of the Convention which deals with the granting of exclusive
jurisdiction to specified courts regarding certain subject matters, notably real property, certain
proceedings involving companies, industrial property rights, and others.
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the benefit of the French long-arm rule permitting a plaintiff to sue a foreign
person in France irrespective of whether the case has any connection with
that country.
C. CORPORATE DOMICILE AND JURISDICTION
Corporations are provided for in Article 53(1) of Title V of the Conven-
tion:
For the purposes of this Convention, the seat of a company or other legal person
or association of natural or legal persons shall be treated as its domicile. However,
in order to determine that seat, the court shall apply its rules of private interna-
tional law.
To implement this provision, it was necessary to provide in section 42 of
the 1982 Act that a corporation or association has its seat in the United
Kingdom, if and only if it was incorporated or formed under the law of a part
of the United Kingdom and has its registered office or some other official
address there or its central management and control is exercised in the
United Kingdom. It follows that a corporation registered in the United
States will only be considered to be domiciled in the United Kingdom and
liable to suit there under the Convention's jurisdictional rules, if its central
management and control 50 is exercised in the United Kingdom.
In addition to the basic jurisdictional principle of domicile, the Conven-
tion in Title I, section 2, Article 5 contains complicated special bases for
jurisdiction such as the place of performance of obligations in relation to a
contract and the place where a branch agency or similar establishment is
located in relation to disputes concerning such a branch agency or establish-
ment. Furthermore, the Convention sets up various exclusive grounds of
jurisdiction relating to intellectual property, consumer contracts and insur-
ance contracts, under section 5, Article 16.
D. ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS
The Convention provides that the enforcement procedure shall apply to
all judgments (not limited to money judgments or to final judgments) and
whether or not they are against persons domiciled in a Member State. A
judgment against a person not domiciled in. a Member State under the
50. "Central management and control" is the test for determining a company's residence for
United Kingdom tax purposes. A company doing business outside the United Kingdom but
controlled from the latter is taxable on all its income and gains. The Inland Revenue's approach
in applying the test is to determine whether the company's directors themselves exercise central
management and control. If so, to establish where this is exercised, and if not, where and by
whom it is exercised.
VOL. 18, NO. 4
INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 1053
long-arm jurisdiction of the English courts would be enforceable in all other
member states. This would apply, inter alia, to the U.S. citizen in the
aforementioned example, if such a judgment were rendered against him.
Article 59 of the Convention, however, permits a Member State to enter
into a bilateral agreement on the recognition and enforcement of judgments
with, for example, the United States or other third country, whereby the
former would agree not to recognize judgments given by the courts of other
Member States against defendants "domiciled or habitually resident" in the
United States or other third country, where jurisdiction was taken on a
long-arm basis. The enforcement of judgments given in civil and commercial
matters will follow automatically, provided they are not contrary to public
policy and that the defendant's rights have been respected. Enforcement
requires a registration of the judgment in the enforcing jurisdiction by ex
parte procedure.
The scope of the Convention and of the 1982 Act indicates that the latter
will have a wider effect upon the assets of non-EEC nationals than under
existing English law.
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